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The problem in setting out a reasonable and fair account of 
Skepticism often arises in the very complexities that give it its 
unique strengths. For every scholar who insists on one under-
standing or reading of the philosophy’s central sources, there 
are a myriad of opposing viewpoints. The lacunae in time 
and the textual record that stand between us and the skeptics 
certainly do not assist the eager student in any meaningful 
way. Consequently, any reconstructive efforts require a good 
deal of creativity and a delicate touch so as not to oblit-
erate the nuances of this rather singular philosophy. Even 
some of the central tenets and problems of this philosophy 
require care and attention lest they be lost in the dustbin 
of history. Two such central problems in skeptic episte-
mology—or rather, which arise in the concerns of skeptic 
epistemology—are those of ataraxia (ἀταραξία) and apraxia 
(ἀπραξία). The former consists of the bliss asserted to arise 
in the final suspension of belief and the withholding of assent 
in epochē (ἐποχή). Meanwhile, the latter describes a central 
problem in skepticism, namely, that of how one is to act when 
all certainty is gone from life. As a mode of argumentation, 
Skepticism was and is strong, but when it came to the problem 
of apraxia, it took a level of philosophical systematization that 
would carry Skepticism away from its dialectical roots. 
There are essentially two schools of skeptic thought attested 
during the Hellenistic era: those of the Pyrrhonists (or 
Pyrrhonians) and those of the Academics. The latter arose in 
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what had been Plato’s academy in the mid third century B.C. 
due to the innovations of the Academy’s leader, Arcesilaus, 
who, according to Diogenes Laertius, “was the first to 
suspend [making] assertions because of the contradiction 
among arguments. He was also the first to argue both sides 
of a question and the first to change the doctrine handed 
down by Plato….”¹ Arcesilaus, by all reports, was a contro-
versial and infuriating figure, who took no small pleasure in 
the polemic aspect of philosophy, particularly when it came 
to agitating the Stoics. In this, he came equipped with a 
honed and updated dialectical method drawn from the earlier 
dialogues of Plato.² Indeed, Numenius said that “nobody 
knew about Arcesilaus’ stand any more than they knew about 
which side the son of Tydaeus was on, about whom Homer 
said that no one knew whether he sided with the Trojans or 
the Achaeans,” as well as that “[he] took precautions so that 
he would not have difficulties, never appearing to endorse a 
dogma, but rather emitting the suspension of judgment for his 
own protection, like the ink emitted by a squid.”³ Arcesilaus 
was leery of the validity of sense impressions, as all skeptics 
were to varying extents, but the specific cause of this caution 
is rather uncertain. For Thorsrud, Arcesilaus’s argument 
against knowledge built upon kataleptic sense impressions 
is not due to his own commitment to this view, but rather 
due to a dialectical strategy designed to “[lead] his dogmatic 
interlocutors to admit that they themselves are unwillingly 
committed to it.”⁴ Just as Arcesilaus never endorsed dogma, so 
he designed his argumentative strategy in order that it never 
allowed space for the unquestioned acceptance of dogma. 
This view of the philosopher is premised upon a view of 
Arcesilaus deeply indebted to the Socratic method and 
particularly to the style of argumentation carried out in the 
earlier dialogues, where, in the end, no lasting conclusion is 
made either by Socrates or his interlocutor. Consequently 
Thorsrud views Arcesilaus as primarily teaching others to 
suspend their judgment, rather than rely upon dogmatic 
1.  Diogenes Laertius 4.28, 
quoted in Inwood and 
Gerson (1997), 261.
2. Thorsrud (2010), 59.
3.  Numenius in Eusebius 
Prep. Ev. bk. xiv, ch. vi, 
730b-731c, quoted in 
Inwood and Gerson 
(1997), 262. 
4. Thorsrud (2010), 61.
26 discentes magazine discentes magazine 27
Stoic beliefs regarding the nature of knowledge. A.A. Long 
shares a similar view, regarding any position Arcesilaus (and 
by extension, anyone following in his particular approach) 
might pick up as held entirely for the purposes of counter-ar-
gumentation, rather than for the purposes of forwarding a 
particular understanding of knowledge, and, in doing so, 
commit to any belief regarding the truth value of a given 
argument.⁵ 
In this regard, Arcesilaus is indebted to a revolution in the 
realm of epistemological inquiry that seems to have taken 
place around the start of the Hellenistic era. As Gisela Striker 
informs, “Towards the end of the fourth century B.C., Greek 
epistemology appears to undergo some dramatic changes. 
New technical terms are introduced, indicating a shift of 
interest from the question ‘what is knowledge?’—assuming 
that there is such a thing—to ‘is there any knowledge?”⁶ This 
revolution serves as the grounds from which the Skeptic 
schools of thought would emerge. This question too serves as 
a one of the major indications of the alteration of the modes 
of inquiry that had served Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in 
good stead, a refinement of the philosophical language to 
reflect increasingly complicated and abstruse problems. From 
this re-centering of the central question of epistemology 
arose the potential for philosophers such as the skeptics to 
further challenge these central assumptions. For the skeptics, 
identifying self-evident truth could not lead to objective 
knowledge, as earlier philosophers had argued; without a 
foundation upon which truth can be established, this compo-
sitional work is impossible.⁷ While later skeptics would 
complicate this somewhat, an analysis of such will have to 
wait briefly for Pyrrho to have his turn first.
What Arcesilaus is to the Academic skeptics, Pyrrho is to the 
Pyrrhonists and more. By all accounts, Pyrrho was a formi-
dable thinker and an even more sincere practitioner of the 
philosophy he preached, who apparently once issued a remark 
5. Long (2006), 110.
6. Striker (1996), 150.
7. Striker (1996), 161.
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to lament the seeming difficulties of divesting “oneself entirely 
of one’s humanity.”⁸ As might be imagined from such a 
statement, Pyrrho’s reputation to the skeptic community was 
formidable; as Groarke argues, it is perhaps due to Pyrrho’s 
strength and conviction that he was such a valuable thinker to 
the Pyrrhonist tradition: he promises a certainty that finds its 
origin in the ability to reject unsubstantiated and unverifiable 
claims.⁹ The differences between the Pyrrhonist school and 
 Pyrrho in Thomas Stanley History of Philosophy 
8. Burnyeat (1997), 57.
9. Groarke (1990), 91.
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the Academic school are several, but in practice are difficult if 
not impossible to parse out, because, as the magisterial Jacques 
Brunschwig posits, “the two traditions were [mutually] 
contaminated from the start.”¹⁰ Arising in the same culture 
in similar philosophical climates, and sharing a funda-
mental principle (albeit one interpreted in several different 
ways), the two skeptic schools were indebted to each other 
where they did not draw upon the same sources. Indeed, in 
some accounts, Aenesidemus founded the Pyrrhonist school 
centuries after Pyrrho, inspired by his predecessor’s resolute 
example, who “split off from the dogmatism of the Academy 
of his time.”¹¹ Furthermore, it is very difficult to establish the 
differences between two philosophical schools that, as Striker 
points out somewhat dramatically, “advocate no theories at 
all.”¹² For the sake of time and space, however, I shall avoid 
discussing the overall differences between the schools much 
further. Suffice it to say that the differences arise primarily 
in methodology, where the Academics were always more 
interested in controverting philosophical positions, whereas 
Pyrrhonists did not engage with the dogmatist Stoics or 
Epicureans on the same level, rather arguing by opposing the 
“sense impressions or unreflective ordinary beliefs.”¹³
Pyrrho envisioned skepticism as having a significant moral 
component or moral promise, whereby aporia (ἀπορία, 
the state of being at a loss, having withheld all assent to 
sense impressions) is one of total tranquility.¹⁴ In contrast, 
Arcesilaus, following in the tradition of Socrates, believed 
quite the opposite, since for Socrates “aporia is a spur to 
further inquiry, not a welcome state of calm….”¹⁵ The 
state of realizing one’s total inability to know anything, for 
Pyrrho, was one of perfect bliss, where you can be disturbed 
in no way by no one. There can be no fear or other negative 
emotions in a state of epochē (ἐποχή—suspension). Burnyeat 
clarifies, saying, “Remove belief, and the emotions will 
disappear; as fear, for example fades when one is dissuaded 
of one’s belief that the thing one was afraid of is dangerous. 
10.  Brunschwig (1999), 
251.
13. Striker (1996), 142.
14. Thorsrud (2010), 62.
15. Thorsrud (2010), 62.
11. Striker (1996), 136.
12. Striker (1996), 136.
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At least to the extent that emotions derive from reason and 
thought, they must disappear when judgment is suspended on 
every question of fact or value.”¹⁶ 
Yet here the problem of apraxia enters. If one is in a state of 
ataraxia, where is the instigation to act? Are we not for intents 
and purposes mere vegetables should we neglect this faculty? 
This is the area where the Stoics and Epicureans found the 
most ammunition to hurl against the Skeptics, in arguing 
that Skepticism is essentially a passive mode of argumentation 
and when it comes to promoting action is entirely inade-
quate. In such a way Arcesilaus offered an argument against 
the problem of apraxia by controverting the Stoic preoccu-
pation with the issue of assent and arguing that assent was not 
an integral component of action.¹⁷ Instead, he argues that to 
act reasonably would be to act correctly, and that thereby one 
can lead a happy life even without ever committing oneself 
to a sense impression.¹⁸ However, the dogmatists reaction to 
this would clearly be that without assent, this would be to 
reduce the actions of the wise to the instinctual reflexes of 
animals. This method of argumentation is also an area where 
the skeptics would always face significant trouble because, 
as Gisela Striker points on in a later addendum to her work 
comparing the Pyrrhonists and Academics, “the problem is 
that in order to get rid of philosophy, the Skeptic himself 
has to engage in philosophy.”¹⁹ Carneades, faced with the 
problems of Arcesilaus’s skepticism, emerged to challenge the 
dogmatists by doing exactly that. Far more of a philosopher 
in the Hellenistic mold than his predecessor in Arcesilaus,²⁰ 
Carneades was more willing to engage in active philoso-
phizing, rather than simply rebutting opponents.²¹
While this makes Carneades particularly valuable, it simul-
taneously made the Skeptics vulnerable in the future.²² He 
held that it was “possible to adhere to a persuasive impression 
without assenting to it.” By that, he means that the Skeptic 
could assent to the proposition that something appeared 
16. Burnyeat (1997), 45.
17. Thorsrud (2010), 67.
18. Vogt (2010), 169.
19. Striker, (2010), 206.
20. Schofield (1999), 350.
21. Schofield (1999), 340.
22. Vogt (2010), 171.
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to be so, without ever committing oneself to it.²³ In doing 
this, Carneades forwarded a different notion of assent than 
that which the Stoics believed. In doing so, it seems likely 
he primarily intended just to argue against the Stoics, but he 
wound up so producing the “official epistemological position 
of [the skeptic] school.”²⁴ The result of this would be a state 
of affairs such that Aenesidemus could accuse the disputations 
between the later skeptics and Stoics as being “Stoics fighting 
Stoics,”²⁵ due to the way that, arguing against Chrysippus, 
Carneades wound up suffusing the language of skepticism 
with Stoic terminology. 
The end result of Carneades’ answer to the problem of apraxia 
was that he accidentally caused a systematization of Academic 
Greek philosophers Arcesilaus and 
Carneades, from the title page of 
Cicero’s Academica.
23. Striker (2010), 201.
24. Striker (2010), 202.
25. Striker (2010), 202.
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skepticism that would result, ultimately, in the conversion of 
Antiochus of Ascalon. The decline of the pure skepticism was 
imminent, but the traditions of uncompromising anti-dog-
matism that originated with Pyrrho and Arcesilaus would 
remain strong in the Pyrrhonist school of skeptic thought, 
and would go on to shape modern philosophy when the 
nascent Descartes was exposed to them many centuries later. 
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